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This paper presents a model of economic growth where products are
invented and patented, and where production involves ﬁxed costs at the
location of the plant. The model is used to assess the eﬀects of instanta-
neous integration of a small, autarkic country into a larger economy on a)
consumer welfare and b) the distribution of income.
Consumer welfare in the small country rises immediately because of
newly available products. Additionally, the welfare of all consumers rises
due to economies of scale at the ﬁrm level. These latter beneﬁts are gradu-
ally replaced by beneﬁts stemming from newly invented products.
The distribution of income changes due to a) the asymmetric distribu-
tion of patent ownership and b) changes in the ratio’s of skilled to unskilled
workers.
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1 Introduction
During the Uruguay round, the members of the WTO reached an agreement on
the trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The objective of
TRIPS is stated in article 7 of the agreement:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner con-
ducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations. (World Trade Organization 1994, Annex 1C)
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1The principle way by which this objective is to be pursued is stated in article
3, paragraph 1 of the treaty.
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treat-
ment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection of intellectual property (...) (World Trade
Organization 1994, Annex 1C)
Given the controversies about the protection of foreign intellectual property
rights (IPRs) in developing countries, the suggested relation between the enforce-
ment of IPRs and the level of welfare deserves a closer look. This paper assesses
the eﬀects of economic integration on welfare when IPRs are strictly enforced. It
shows that aggregate welfare increases in response to economic integration but
also that it may severely aﬀect the short and medium term distribution of income
within and between countries.
Protection of intellectual property ensures economic growth by the standard
argument that it provides ﬁrms with an incentive to develop new products. Eco-
nomic integration temporarily strengthens this incentive as producers suddenly see
the market for their products increase. Technological change and thus economic
growth are stimulated by economic integration in much of the same way as they
are stimulated by population growth.
Economic integration may have a substantial impact on the distribution of
income when IPRs are enforced irrespective of the country of invention as envis-
aged in paragraph 3.1 of TRIPS. The principle argument can be easily explained.
Suppose there exist two autarkic countries of a diﬀerent size. Within each country
each product is patented and is manufactured by just one ﬁrm. Then it is not
unreasonable to assume that the number of product types in the large country is
larger than that in the small country, and that many of the types in the small
country are similar to some type in the large country.
When the two countries decide to form an economic union, some comparable
patents will have been registered in both countries. These patents will only be
valid for the country of origin; the other patents will become valid for the entire
economic union. Clearly, the value of the patents with limited validity will be
lower than the value of the other patents.
Because the majority of ﬁrms with a fully valid patent will be located in the
large country, the average value of ﬁrms in the large country will rise more than
the average value of ﬁrms in the small country. Many ﬁrms in the large country
will see the market for their products expand, while this unlikely for small country
ﬁrms.
The asymmetric eﬀect of economic integration on the value of ﬁrms implies that
the beneﬁts of integration will be larger for shareholders in the large country than
they will be for shareholders in the small country. The shareholders in the large
country get a ‘free lunch’ in the form of market expansion, which is not enjoyed
by shareholders in the other country. In this way, the international protection of
IPRs will contribute to the proliferation of income inequality without stimulating
economic growth.
2In this paper, a model of semi-endogenous growth is presented that illustrates
this and other consequences of economic integration. In the model, production
involves ﬁxed costs at the location of the plant. The economies of scale that arise
from these ﬁxed cost provide an incentive for international trade ` a la Krugman
(1979). What distinguishes this model from other models of international trade is
that new product types have to be invented before they can be produced – a feature
due to Judd (1985). Two exceptions to this rule are the models by Grossman and
Helpman (1989) and Peretto (2003). In the former model, however, there are no
ﬁxed costs of production, which leads to substantially diﬀerent conclusions about
the structure of trade. In the latter model, all research is directed towards quality
improvements while product variety is determined by the size of the market relative
to ﬁxed costs – the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) result.
Normally, product variety in trade models is determined by the Dixit-Stiglitz
mechanism. Because in the current model products ﬁrst have to be invented,
economic integration does not cause an immediate rise in the number of ﬁrms.
Rather, the initial advantage of economic integration lies in the increased scale
of production. Over time, the number of products gradually increases as the
enhanced proﬁtability of ﬁrms induces research. In a nutshell, the model presented
here uniﬁes the approaches to product variety by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Judd (1985).
Two sacriﬁces have been made to keep the model tractable. First, trade is
assumed to be costless. The introduction of trading costs appears to be diﬃ-
cult when proﬁts are positive.1 Second, intertemporal knowledge spillovers are
not easily combined with ﬁxed costs and are therefore omitted. Consequentially,
the model is restricted to semi-endogenous growth (i.e. economic growth that ulti-
mately depends on population growth). Factor immobility is preserved throughout
this paper.
Each product is manufactured with skilled and unskilled labor. As all products
are symmetric this brings up the question of how factor price equalization (FPE)
is achieved. The route to FPE that is followed here is that of vertical specializa-
tion by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the spirit of Helpman and Krugman
(1985, chaps. 12 and 13). If factor proportions diﬀer across countries, a ﬁrm will
have an incentive to split up its production process into a part that uses skilled
labor and a part that uses unskilled labor. A consequence of this strategy is the
existence of and trade in intermediate products. Whether these intermediate trade
ﬂows are intraﬁrm or whether they take place between two ﬁrms (one of which a
subcontractor) does not matter here. So, in stead of moving factors of production
to the place where they are relatively scarce, production processes are located in
such a way that the costs of production are minimal.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of an (inte-
grated) economy with patented products and ﬁxed production costs. The eﬀects
on aggregate welfare of two autarkic countries of unequal size forming an eco-
nomic union are discussed in section 3. Section 4 treats the implications for the
distribution of income. Concluding remarks can be found in section 5.
1Peretto (2003) did ﬁnd a way to combine quality R&D in the presence of trading costs.
32 The model
The economy is inhabited by two dynastic households.2 One household comprises
all unskilled workers, L, and one household has all skilled workers, H, as its
members. The most important diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled labor is
that the former has an alternative use. The amount of skilled labor in the economy
is partly employed for production, Hy, and partly for research, HR. ‘Lifetime’
utility of the households is the discounted sum of ‘instantaneous’ utility u with




ΛτuΛ,τ exp[ρ(t − τ)]dτ, ∀Λ ∈ {L,H} (1)
Each household derives instantaneous utility from a consumption index C that
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Firms and product types are indexed by i ∈ [0,n]. Products are produced in two
stages. The ﬁrst stage involves only unskilled labor, l, and returns intermediate
products. At the second stage, skilled labor, h, and stage 1 products, ˜ y, are used
to produce stage 2 products. Products require ﬁxed expenditure at both stages:
˜ y (i) = ˜ al(i) −˜ b (4)
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˜ a and a are parameters; ˜ b and b are the ﬁxed costs at the ﬁrst and second stage
of production, respectively.
Each product type is patented and is manufactured by only one ﬁrm, but the
two stages of production do not necessarily take place in the same country. Firms
can be ‘binational’. The underlying idea is that a ﬁrm buys a patent on a product
that is designed keeping in mind that it can be costly to gather all the inputs in a
single place. More speciﬁcally, a part of the product is assumed to be producible
separately and to require only unskilled labor. This intermediate product can
be shipped without costs to any country within the economic region where it is
‘upgraded’ to a consumable good with the use of skilled labor.
2The absence of migration strictly implies that all members of a household are located in the
same country. The shortcut taken here yields the same outcome as long as the growth rate of
the population is the same for each country.
















The wage rate of unskilled labor is denoted by w, the wage rate of skilled labor is
ω. Because ﬁrms are symmetric the prices of all products are equal. The ratio of












The consumption index is taken to be the numeraire, implying that total expen-
diture is equal to C.
C = n
1
γy = npyy ⇒ py = n
1−γ
γ (8)
Although no trade and migration exists between autarkic economies, no autar-
kic economy is assumed to function in complete isolation from the rest of the world.
In particular, a certain degree of knowledge spillovers occurs between economies.
Researchers will imitate a product that has been invented in another economy
rather than try to invent a product that is entirely new – simply because imita-
tion is cheaper. The ﬂow of patents, each representing a design of a new product
type, depends on the number of researchers employed and on whether the product
is an imitation or a true invention.3 A researcher can produce one design at the
time or he can produce δ > 1 imitations. Imitation is only possible when the
number of product types in the world, nw, is strictly larger than the number of
types available ‘domestically’. Summarizing what has been stated above, the ﬂow
of new products is given by:
˙ n =
½
HR if n = nw
δHR if n < nw
(9)
The dot denotes the derivative with respect to time.
Entry and exit are free in the research sector thus proﬁts in the research sector
are zero. The value of a design, v, is limited by the wage a researcher receives.
v ≤ ω (10)
The distribution of total revenues from production can be found using the wage
ratio and both expressions for the price.
C = wL + ωHy + nπ (11)


















3Knowledge spillovers from previous research eﬀorts are omitted in order to keep the dynamic
behavior of the model tractable.
5Using these last results, the proﬁt to skilled wage ratio can be expressed as
π
ω





















(1 − β)˜ b
β˜ a









where π represents the proﬁts of a ﬁrm.
The Ramsey rule is the same for both households.




Variables wearing a hat are growth rates; the (constant) growth rate of the work-
force is gP. The total population, P, is the sum of L and H. Substitute for ˆ C and
π/v in the Ramsey rule to get the optimal growth rate of consumption, provided
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The balanced growth rate can straightforwardly be found. The equations for
consumption (19) and consumption growth (18) show that the growth rate of
consumption can only be constant if ˆ L = ˆ H = gP. Equations 9 and 19 reveal that
the balanced growth rate of consumption is 1
γgP. It immediately follows that per
capita consumption growth is
1−γ
γ gP, even though knowledge spillovers are absent.
The model is characterized by ‘semi-endogenous’ growth, that is, economic growth
depends crucially on population growth. That the model is saddle path stable is
shown in the appendix.
3 Aggregate welfare
The approach to economic integration adopted in this paper is that of a ‘big bang’
uniﬁcation of two economies: a large one, labeled A, and a small one, labeled
B. Before uniﬁcation, both economies are autarkic. After uniﬁcation, the two
economies form a single integrated economy.
According to the model of the previous section, the number of products is
linearly related to the size of the population in the steady state. This implies
that, before uniﬁcation, the large country has more product types than the small
country. What happens to the number of types in each countries after uniﬁcation
depends on how similar the two sets of types are.
6The larger size of country A ensures that the ﬂow of new product designs
is larger than in country B, assuming that both countries are in their steady
state. This diﬀerence in the ﬂow of new products (eventually) causes the number
of products in A to exceed the number of products in B. For this reason, all
researchers in country B will be busy imitating designs invented in country A. As
a result, the products that are available in country B are a subset of the products
available in A. After the economies of the two countries have integrated there will
no longer be imitation in any of the two countries.
Throughout this paper, I assume that the order in which products are invented
is the same for both economies. The idea behind this assumption is that new types
of goods are generally more luxurious than existing types. The incentive for the
invention of a luxurious good is supposedly lower than that for a less luxurious
goods as the market for the latter is larger.
The consequence of this line of reasoning is that before uniﬁcation, the set
of types of the small country is completely contained in the large country’s set
of types. Immediately after uniﬁcation, the set of types of the newly formed
economy equals that of the large country. Consumers in the small country will see
an immediate expansion in the number of types, whereas consumers in the large
country will not see an immediate change.
There is a slight complication arising from the fact that a subset of product
types is patented in both the large and the small country – presumably by dif-
ferent ﬁrms. The natural way of dealing with this situation is to preserve the
rights attached to the patent only for the country it was valid for preceding the
uniﬁcation. Firms originally established in country B will still be allowed to sell
their products domestically, but it will not be possible for them to sell in country
A. Firms in country A can sell their products in both countries, provided that the
product has not been patented in country B prior to uniﬁcation.
The duopoly that arises for some products is not stable. Increasing returns to
scale at the ﬁrm level provides an incentive for the shareholders of two ﬁrms owning
a patent on the same product to force a merger of the two ﬁrms. Consequently,
uniﬁcation triggers an instantaneous wave of ‘cross-border’ mergers.
The occurrence of mergers raises the issue of how dividends should be dis-
tributed among shareholders from the two countries. The most neutral way of
handling this problem is by assuming a ‘fair deal’ such that dividends are allo-
cated according to the size of the future market of each country. In particular, if
nB,0 is number of ﬁrms that merge and κ∗
ι is the long term share of country ι in
the aggregate income of the integrated economy, then the dividends received by
country ι are nB,0πκ∗
ι.
Another issue concerns the eﬀects of uniﬁcation on the location of production.
If the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is the same in both countries, no plants
will be relocated; only some of the redundant plants of merged ﬁrms will be closed.
When the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is not the same in both countries,
some ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage in vertical specialization, separating
the production of intermediates from that of ﬁnal goods. A part of the production
of intermediates will then be shifted to the country with a relative abundance
7of unskilled workers, while a part of the production of ﬁnal goods moves in the
opposite direction.
The relocation of plants ensures that, given the type of labor, wage rates are
identical across the entire integrated economy. If this would not be the case, a ﬁrm
could increase its proﬁts by relocating a part of its production activities. Hence,
the integrated economy is truly integrated even though labor migration is absent.
It is the movement of economic activity rather than the movement of production
factors that ensures FPE.
Having settled the issues concerning property rights and FPE, we can now
turn to the eﬀects of economic integration on income and consumption. After
the transition path of the integrated economy has been found (see appendix), the
consumption paths of the households of the two countries have to be derived.
According to the Ramsey rule (equation 17) consumption grows at the same pace
in both countries. This implies that the allocation of consumption between the
two countries is constant over time.
Ruling out unsustainable debts, each country’s share in total consumption
should not exceed its share in long-term income, Cιt/Ct ≤ κ∗
ι. Because this con-
dition has to hold for all countries simultaneously, Cιt = κ∗
ιCt. Once we know κ∗
ι,
we can solve for the consumption paths of both countries. Aggregate income in
country ι is given by










where Wι0 is the equivalent in number of ﬁrms of shareholdings by country ι


















In the last term, sd is the period after which distribution of income is (approxi-
mately) stable. The ﬁrst term is constant as soon as the integrated economy is
in the steady state. In the second term, both Wιsd and nsd are asymptotically
















The constants k0ι and k1 follow from the steady state solution for the integrated
economy.
Figure 1 displays consumption per capita of the small country before, t < 0,
and after, t > 0, the uniﬁcation. Clearly, uniﬁcation has an immediate and large
impact on the consumption of the small country’s inhabitants. Consumption rises
for two reasons. First, uniﬁcation yields immediate access to the product types
that previously were only available in the large country. This is similar to the eﬀect
discussed by Romer (1994) and is clearly visible in ﬁgure 2. Second, the larger
markets for products brought about by uniﬁcation enables further exploitation of









Figure 1: Per capita consumption – small country
economies of scale due to ﬁxed costs. The increase in the scale of production is
illustrated by ﬁgure 3.
Unlike the inhabitants of the small country, the inhabitants of the large country
do not seem to have any immediate beneﬁts from uniﬁcation (ﬁgure 4). For the
large country, uniﬁcation does not bring about a spectacular expansion of the set
of product types, although the growth of the number of types does temporarily
accelerate as can be seen from ﬁgure 5.
The increase in scale caused by uniﬁcation has an upward eﬀect on proﬁts.
Higher proﬁts, in turn, induce people to increase their savings rate – hence the
initial decline in consumption in ﬁgure 4 – and causes the value of shares to inﬂate.
High share prices make research more attractive and cause the rate of invention
to accelerate.
The acceleration in the rate of introduction of new products is not sustainable.
The high rate of invention has a depressing eﬀect on the scale of production and,
consequently, on proﬁts. This causes the number of researchers relative to the size
of the population to decline until the steady state is reached.
Concluding, uniﬁcation leads to an immediate increase in product variety for
the inhabitants of the small country while simultaneously raising the scale of
production in both countries. The subsequent rise in proﬁts stimulates research
and induces the invention of new goods.
4 Income inequality
In the integrated economy, four groups of households can be distinguished: skilled
workers in A, unskilled workers in A, skilled workers in B, and unskilled workers in










Figure 2: Number of types consumed – small country







Figure 3: Scale of production – both countries










Figure 4: Per capita consumption – large country







Figure 5: Number of types consumed – large country
11B. Each of these groups can be aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by economic integration.
In this section, the income and consumption of the four groups for two scenario’s.
The ﬁrst scenario is that of the previous section where a small economy merges
with a large economy that has the same ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. In the
second scenario, the small economy has an abundance of unskilled labor relative
to the large economy.
The consumption path for each group can be found in a manner analogous to
the procedure that was used to ﬁnd the consumption paths of the two countries.
By the Ramsey rule the share in aggregate consumption of group j is constant
over time, equalling κ∗
j. This property facilitates the derivation of the distribution
of income.
Inﬁnite horizon utility maximization causes consumption paths to be governed
entirely by the long term distribution of income. This obscures some of the distri-
butional eﬀects of integration that would occur in real life. To get a better grasp
of the short and medium term eﬀects of uniﬁcation it is useful to take a look at
the income paths of the four groups.
Unfortunately, these income paths still have to be recovered. Income for the
individual groups depends on wages, on initial shareholdings, and on shareholdings
accumulated after t = 0.




















































In the expression stated above, κ∗
0j is the long term share of group j in the ag-
gregate income of the corresponding autarkic economy before uniﬁcation. Patents
ranging from nB0 to nA0 are only possessed by ﬁrms in country A.
As the level of income at t > 0 depends on the income of previous periods,










Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀects of uniﬁcation on per capita income and con-
sumption.4 The ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is the same in both countries.
The ﬁgure clearly visualizes three phenomena. Without a doubt, the most
important phenomenon is the increase in welfare for the inhabitants of country B
caused by access to a wider set of products from t = 0 onwards. This has already
been discussed in the previous section.
A second phenomenon is the jump in the income of skilled workers in country A.
This group owns the majority of the shares in country A ﬁrms. After uniﬁcation,
most of these ﬁrms can suddenly sell to consumers in B because they own patents
4The parameter settings are the same as in the previous section.






Ypc,Cpc Skilled workers country B








Ypc,Cpc Unskilled workers country B








Ypc,Cpc Skilled workers country A






Ypc,Cpc Unskilled workers country A
Figure 6: Ypc (solid) and Cpc (dashed) by income group
on products that were not registered in country B. The corresponding rise in
proﬁts is mainly appropriated by skilled workers in A.
Third, consumption by households in country B exceeds their income. These
households can lend from households in country A because their current share in
income is below its long term value. This implies that the debt accumulated by
country B will vanish asymptotically and is therefore sustainable.
Figure 7 shows net income from the possession of assets for all four groups.
Especially skilled workers in A see their income from assets increase in response
to the integration of the two economies. Unskilled workers in country B become
net debtors very quickly (around t = 5).
As both countries have the same ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, the
eﬀects of uniﬁcation on the ratio of wages, ω/w, are only transitory. This can be
seen in ﬁgure 8. The temporary rise in the wages of skilled workers relative to
the wages of unskilled workers is due to the increased attractiveness of research.
Once the steady state has been reached, the ratio of wages has returned to the
pre-uniﬁcation level.
When the two integrating economies have an identically composed labor force,
virtually all persistent changes in the distribution of income are due to the un-
equal distribution of shares between small country shareholders and large country
shareholders. After uniﬁcation, the shareholders of the small country suddenly
have a minority stake in just a handful of ﬁrms. This contrasts sharply with the
pre-uniﬁcation era during which domestic shareholders controlled all the ﬁrms sell-
ing products on the domestic market. It also contrasts sharply with gains from
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Figure 7: Net asset income








       
w
Figure 8: Wage inequality – both countries








Ypc,Cpc Skilled workers country B








Ypc,Cpc Unskilled workers country B





Ypc,Cpc Skilled workers country A





Ypc,Cpc Unskilled workers country A
Figure 9: Ypc (solid) and Cpc (dashed) by income group; shock in H/L
uniﬁcation for shareholders in the large country.
Next, we will turn to the second scenario in which the small country’s ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers is much lower than that of the large country. In
particular, for the small country HB/LB = 0.2 while for the large country this
ratio is kept at 0.4. The other parameters are the same as with the ﬁrst scenario,
such that the ratio H/L for the entire post-uniﬁcation economy equals 0.38.
Figure 9 shows income and consumption per capita for the four groups. In
comparison with the previous scenario, unskilled workers in B gain more from
integration than before as do the skilled workers in A, whereas there do not seem
to be any gains anymore for unskilled workers in A. The gains for skilled workers
are less than with the ﬁrst scenario.
All these deviations from the ﬁrst scenario are the result of the change in
the ratio of wages. Contrary to what was the case previously, uniﬁcation has
permanent eﬀects on the ratio ω/w in the second scenario. This is not surprising
as the relative ratio of skilled to unskilled workers after uniﬁcation is 0.38 in stead
of 0.4. In the small country ω/w falls sharply after uniﬁcation (ﬁgure 10), while
ω/w rises somewhat in the large country (ﬁgure 11).
Besides the direct eﬀect of the change in the wages, there is also an indirect
eﬀect that severely reduces the gains from integration for the shareholders in
country B, mostly skilled workers. As can be seen from ﬁgures 3 and 12, the rise in
H/L has aﬀected the scale of production. The scarcity of skilled labor had worked
as a ‘barrier to invention’ – or rather, a ‘barrier to imitation’ – thereby leading
to fewer product types per capita and higher proﬁts than is the case in scenario
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Figure 10: Wage inequality – small country; shock in H/L
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Figure 11: Wage inequality – large country; shock in H/L






Figure 12: Scale of production (ﬁnal products) – small country
one. Due to the disappearance of this ‘barrier to invention’, the shareholders in
country B have less to gain from uniﬁcation than in the ﬁrst scenario.
5 Concluding remarks
Economic integration enables consumers in small countries to buy a larger variety
of products. Additionally, the welfare of all consumers rises due to economies
of scale at the ﬁrm level. The corresponding rise in proﬁts makes research more
attractive, which leads to the invention of new products. In this way, the beneﬁts
due to economies of scale are gradually replaced by beneﬁts stemming from newly
invented products.
Although economic integration stimulates aggregate welfare, the gains from
integration are not likely to be distributed evenly. In the typical situation where a
small country with many unskilled workers joins a large economy, changes in the
distribution of income is only partly caused by the change in relative wages.
The enforcement of IPRs has two eﬀects on the distribution of income. First,
not all shareholders beneﬁt equally from integration due to the asymmetric validity
of patents. Contrary to shareholders in the large economy, all of the wealth of
small country shareholders is invested in patents with limited geographical validity.
By this mechanism, the international protection of IPRs will contribute to the
proliferation of income inequality. Second, the ‘barrier to invention’ due to the
scarcity of skilled workers in the small country is reduced after uniﬁcation, which
negatively aﬀects the value of ﬁrms in the small country.
In reality the consequences of rapid economic integration will might be under-
stated by the model. First, patents on imitated products might be ruled illegal,
17thereby strengthening the negative eﬀects of integration on the relative income
of small country shareholders. Second, ﬁrms in the larger economy will tend to
produce goods with a higher quality, such that consumers in the small country
will not only see the range of available products expand but these products will
also be of a higher quality.
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A Stability of the model
A ﬁrst step in the search after the path leading from an initial state of the econ-
omy to balanced growth involves the rescaling of variables such that the rescaled
variables are constant along the balanced growth path. Technically, rescaling




γ l ≡ L
n −
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18The rescaled variables l and h refer to the variable part of the employment by
a single ﬁrm and should not be confused with ly and hy which refer to total
employment by a ﬁrm.
After rescaling equations 9, 19, and 18 become
ˆ ν = hR − gP (23)
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where ϕ ≡ H/L. Except for temporary shocks, the growth rates both of skilled
and of unskilled labor are taken to be equal and constant. This implies that ϕ is
constant as a rule and thus that it is possible to reach the steady state.
The last ﬁve equations yield a system of diﬀerential equations in ν and hR.
























The stability of the ﬁxed point can be checked by a linear approximation to the
system around the steady state. Table 1 reports the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
stemming from the linearized system for a range of plausible parameter values. As
every eigenvalue is accompanied by an eigenvalue of the opposite sign, the ﬁxed
point exhibits saddle point stability. The eigenvectors indicate that the stable and
unstable manifolds do not ‘switch places’ when parameter values change.
The non-linearized transition path has been found using backward integra-
tion (Brunner and Strulik 2002). This technique exploits the fact that the stable
manifold becomes the unstable manifold when time is running backward. A nu-
merical solution to an unstable manifold belonging to a saddle point can be found
easily. With a starting point close to the unstable manifold, the numerical so-
lution will quickly converge to the actual manifold. The parameter values used
in the ﬁrst simulation are β = 0.3, γ = 0.8, ρ = 0.03, gP = 0.01, φ = 0.4, and
a = ˜ a = b = ˜ b = 1 for both countries; P (0) = 1000 and n(0) = 50 for country
A prior to integration; P (0) = 100 and n(0) = 5 for country B prior to integra-
tion. For the second simulation, the following alterations were made: φ = 0.4 for
country A and φ = 0.2 in country B.
19Table 1: Eigenvalues and eigenvectors for linearized system
β γ gP φ Eigenvalue Eigenvector
0.1 0.5 0 0.1
11.5 (0.00712 , 1)
−1.02 (−0.0798 , 1)
0.1 0.5 0 10
0.267×103 (0.179 × 10−3 , 1)
−0.256×103 (−0.186 × 10−3 , 1)
0.1 0.5 0.04 0.1
11.9 (0.0066 , 1)
−1.06 (−0.0739 , 1)
0.1 0.5 0.04 10
0.266×103 (0.179 × 10−3 , 1)
−0.256×103 (−0.187 × 10−3 , 1)
0.1 0.99 0 0.1
25.1 (0.183 × 10−3 , 1)
−14.7 (−0.313 × 10−3 , 1)
0.1 0.99 0 10
0.925×103 (0.00108 × 10−3 , 1)
−0.915×103 (−0.00109 × 10−3 , 1)
0.1 0.99 0.04 0.1
25.1 (0.183 × 10−3 , 1)
−14.7 (−0.312 × 10−3 , 1)
0.1 0.99 0.04 10
0.925×103 (0.00108 × 10−3 , 1)
−0.915×103 (−0.00109 × 10−3 , 1)
0.9 0.5 0 0.1
−1.02 (−0.0461 , 1)
2.21 (0.0212 , 1)
0.9 0.5 0 10
34.7 (0.00236 , 1)
−33.5 (−0.00244 , 1)
0.9 0.5 0.04 0.1
−1.06 (−0.0427 , 1)
2.3 (0.0196 , 1)
0.9 0.5 0.04 10
34.5 (0.00237 , 1)
−33.3 (−0.00246 , 1)
0.9 0.99 0 0.1
11.1 (0.0863 × 10−3 , 1)
−9.93 (−0.0967 × 10−3 , 1)
0.9 0.99 0 10
22.9 (0.201 × 10−3 , 1)
−21.7 (−0.212 × 10−3 , 1)
0.9 0.99 0.04 0.1
11.1 (0.0864 × 10−3 , 1)
−9.96 (−0.0964 × 10−3 , 1)
0.9 0.99 0.04 10
22.9 (0.201 × 10−3 , 1)
−21.7 (−0.212 × 10−3 , 1)
The other parameter values are: ρ = 0.04, a = ˜ a = b = ˜ b = 1
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